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I. INTRODUCTION
In light of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
other recent regional trade block pacts, Latin America has seen
a tremendous increase in its trade and investment markets since
1990. This growth and expansion has led to an increase in many
sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, jobs, and
transportation. These benefits, however, are not without their
problems. Following closely behind these improvements are inju-
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ries, theft, hijackings, and natural disasters. These difficulties
are creating forms of liability in Latin America which either
have never arisen in the region or are emerging out of a rela-
tively small, untapped market. This Article surveys these forms
of liability and proposes the potential risks U.S. and multina-
tional companies will take when operating in these foreign coun-
tries and the consequences which may follow. While not meant
to be an in-depth analysis of any individual form of liability, the
Article attempts to provide an overview of emergent areas of
liability in the region in light of both Latin American and Unit-
ed States' legal practice and theory.
II. AGREEMENTS INCREASING TRADE AND INVESTMENT
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), effec-
tive since January 1, 1994, is the most far-reaching trade agree-
ment in North American history. With the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico as members, the primary purpose of the
NAFTA is to stimulate trade among its member countries
through the liberalization of access to and investments in their
respective markets.' Currently, accession negotiations continue
efforts to bring Chile into the NAFTA as well.2
1. Lowry MeAllen, Trade Surpluses Ease Pain of Mexican Economic Crisis, J.
COM., Oct. 24, 1995, at 16A; Gavin Souter, Cross-Country Coverage, Bus. INS., June
5, 1995, at 2; Anthony de Palma, For Mexico, NAFTA's Promise of Jobs Is Still Just
a Promise, N.Y. TnMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al; Thomas J. Donahue, Delaying NAFTA
Is A Bad Omen, J. CoM., Dec. 28, 1995, at 6A
2. Officials from Canada, the United States, Mexico, and Chile met in Mexico
City from July 25, 1995 until August 1, 1995 to advance discussions toward the
accession of Chile into the NAFTA. With respect to trade, the major area of discus-
sion concerned agreements over environmental, labor, and other provisions which are
not directly related to trade. Politically, the primary obstacle is whether Congress
will approve fast-track negotiating authority, which would speed trade pacts through
Congress, without amendments, to the Clinton Administration. The Clinton Adminis-
tration seeks broad fast-track authority to negotiate agreements not directly related
to trade. However, the Republican Congress drafted a bill limiting fast-track authori-
ty to issues directly related to trade. Although this issue becomes more difficult as
the presidential election advances, the House and the Senate are attempting to draft
a narrowly defined bill to keep talks with Chile alive. John Maggs, House Crafting
Bill to Save Chile Talks, J. CoM., Dec. 13, 1995, at 1A; John Maggs, Dole Becoming
More Amenable to Compromise on Chile Trade Issue, J. CoM., Dec. 19, 1995, at 3A.
A possibility also exists where Mexico and Canada surpass the U.S. and ne-
gotiate separate bilateral trade agreements with Chile. Richard Lawrence & Kevin
1996]
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The NAFTA has succeeded in increasing trade and invest-
ment among its member countries. Consequently, this success
created new areas of liability for multinationals conducting busi-
ness in Mexico (and other Latin American countries) as well as
increased the likelihood of exposure to previously existing areas
of liability in these countries. This Article surveys these emer-
gent and existing areas of liability and the opportunities they
create for the international legal field.
B. Other Regional Trading Blocks
In addition to the NAFTA, other regional trading blocks
have developed in recent years. Like the NAFTA, these blocks
have also given rise to new and existing markets of liability.
Some of these trading blocks include MERCOSUR,3 a customs
union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (effec-
tive as of January 1995); the Andean Pact, a customs union
between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (also
effective as of 1995);' the Group of Three, a free trade zone be-
tween Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela;5 the Central American
Common Market6 (under which El Salvador, Honduras, Guate-
mala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua are in the process of negotiat-
ing a free trade agreement); and the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), which comprises the fourteen English speaking
countries of the region and Suriname.7 There is also a move-
ment to create the Association of Caribbean States (ACS),8 po-
tentially the fourth largest trade block in the world. The ACS
would be comprised of CARICOM, the Group of Three, and the
countries of Central America, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and
G. Hall, Bilateral Deals Could Keep Chile's NAFTA Talks Alive, J. COM., Dec. 6,
1995, at IA; Chile, Canada Start Talks Wednesday On NAFTA-Styled Free-Trade
Agreement, J. COM., Jan. 22, 1996, at 8A-
3. Robert S. Greenberger, Latin Nations, Unsure of U.S. Motives, Make Their
Own Trade Pacts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1996, at Al; Stephen Landle & Nollis
Crigles, Consensus in the Americas: Free Trade by 2005, Bus. MEx., special ed.,
1995, at 70.
4. Cartegena Agreement, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (May 26, 1969).
5. International Trade Developments, INT'L ECON. REv., Jan. 1995 at 10.
6. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960,
455 U.N.T.S. 3.
7. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M.
1033.
8. Caribbean States Sign Regional Cooperation Pact, 11 INT'L TRADE REP.
1179-80 (July 27, 1994).
[Vol. 27:3512
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Haiti.9
Recently, Chile actively negotiated with MERCOSUR to
forge a trade agreement between the two parties. '° At the same
time, MERCOSUR reached an agreement and signed a free-
trade process with the European Union on December 15,
1995." MERCOSUR is also considering joint participation with
the Andean Pact. 2 The Central American countries, on the oth-
er hand, are making progress toward trade integration under
the Central American Economic Integration Association
(SIECA).'3
Trade solely within MERCOSUR rose twenty-five percent in
the past four years.'4 Internal MERCOSUR imports rose from
$5.1 billion in the first half of 1994 to $7.4 billion only one year
later.'5 Internal MERCOSUR imports totalled $12 billion in
1994. ' In the past year, U.S. corporate investment in
MERCOSUR member countries increased and may offer some of
the best overseas investment opportunities for U.S. investors."
In November of 1995, the Interamerican Development Bank in
Washington, D.C. examined and considered multimillion dollar
loan packages for several infrastructure projects in MERCOSUR
countries, including a $450 million loan to the Brazilian govern-
ment to finance the expansion and restoration of its high-
ways.'
8
9. Canute James, Caribbean Leaders Meet to Forge Trade Bloc, J. CoM., Aug.
17, 1995, at 3A-
10. Chile, Mercosur to Negotiate This Month on Trade Agreement, J. COM., Sept.
1, 1995, at 3A, Kevin G. Hall, Chile, Mercosur Extend Trade Talks 90 Days, J.
COM., Dec. 8, 1995, at 1A.
11. Hall, supra note 10, at 8A.
12. Maria Carlino, S. America May Bypass NAFTA-Type Pacts, J. CoM., Dec. 4,
1995, at 2C.
13. Peter Brennan, Central American Trade Integration Advances as NAFTA De-
bate Continues, J. COM., Sept. 7, 1995, at 3A; Zedillo Propone 'Alianza Privilegiada'
En Cumbre de Colegas Centroamericanos, EL NUEVO HERALD, Feb. 16, 1996, at 18.
14. Maria Carlino, Mercosur Transport Projects in Fast Lane, J. COM., Oct. 23,
1995, at 6A; Montieth Illingworth, Mercosur Likely to Improve Region's Trade with
World, J. COM., July 12, 1995, at 6C; Charles W. Thurston, Latin America's Regional
Commerce Outpacing Trading with Rest of World, J. COM., Nov. 21, 1995, at 5B;
Mercosur Trade Bolster Surplus, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, June 23, 1995, at 2.
15. Carlino, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Paula L. Green, Business Panel Recommends U.S. Investment in Mercosur
Nations, J. COM., Oct. 26, 1995, at 5A.
18. Carlino, supra note 14; Thurston, supra note 14.
1996]
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C. Bilateral Trade Agreements
In addition to regional trade blocks, there are more than
twenty-six bilateral trade agreements in Latin America includ-
ing a 1994 free trade agreement between Chile and Colombia,19
a 1992 customs union between Colombia and Venezuela, 0 a
1991 economic complementary agreement between Argentina
and Chile,2' a 1993 free trade agreement between Chile and
Venezuela,22 and a 1991 free trade agreement between Chile
and Mexico.23
Countries in Latin America are in the process of massive
and unprecedented privatization of many state-owned industries.
The privatization of these industries is accomplished primarily
through foreign investments and joint ventures. As a desirable
consequence of these efforts, the development of national infra-
structures such as roadways, telecommunications, railroads, and
power production has accelerated greatly.2'
19. William R. Fadul, Outlook for Latin America - FIDES Perspective,
ROUNDTABLE ON INS. CONDITIONS IN THE AMERICAS, Intl Ins. Council (New York),
Mar. 1, 1995, at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Bolivia Stands by Privatization Plans, J. COM., Feb. 20, 1996, at 5B; Rich-
ard Lawrence, Agency Pledges $1 Billion to Latin Private Sector, J. COM., Feb. 20,
1996, at 1OA; Sam Dillon, Foreign Business to Put $6.3 Billion in Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A4; Untapped Latin Gas Fields Lure N. American European
Investors, J. COM., Sept. 15, 1995, at 9B; Argentina Becomes Expert in Privatization
of Industry, J. COM., Oct. 31, 1995, at 9A; Cardoso's Ambition: Economic Makeover,
J. COM., Oct. 25, 1995, at 4C; Johnathan Friedland & Peter Fritsch, Latin America
Lures U.S. Chemical Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995, at A10; Jonathan Friedland,
Utility Privatization Electrifies Bolivia, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at AS; As
Telecom Charges Sweep Region, Competition Is King," LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Nov. 10,
1995, at 9; James Bruce, Private-Sector Consortium Inks Deals to Oversee Brazil's
No. 1 Highway, J. COM., Nov. 3, 1995, at 10A; Kevin G. Hall, Mexico to Open Bids
in July For Independent Power Plant, J. COM., Dec. 15, 1995, at 5B; Kevin G. Hall,
Brazil Takes First Steps to Privatize Railroad, J. COM., Dec. 8, 1995, at 2B [herein-
after Steps to Privatize Railroad]; Brazil Senate Cleans End of Petrobras Monopoly,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1995, at A16; Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Proposes to Privatize Its
Airports, J. COM., Nov. 20, 1995, p. 2B [hereinafter Privatize Its Airports]; Kevin G.
Hall, Foreign Firms Ready to Enter Mexican Mart, J. COM., Feb. 9, 1996, at 5B.
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III. EMERGING LIABILITIES IN MEXICO AND LATIN AMERICA
As a direct result of the NAFTA and the overall surge of
inestment and trade between the United States and Latin
America, both existing and entirely new areas of liability have
increased or emerged. These areas can be classified into six
general categories: 1) product liability, 2) trucking liability, 3)
environmental liability, 4) labor-related liability and business
interruption, 5) political risk and kidnap/ransom liability, and 6)
directors' and officers' liability (albeit to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent than the first five categories listed). The following sections
of this Article examine each category as a consequence of in-
creased trade and investment in Mexico.25
A. Product Liability
As a result of the peso devaluation debacle of December 20,
1994,6 the ensuing weak peso, high interest rates,27 and
unemployment 28 depressed domestic consumption of goods and
investment in Mexico. 29 However, those same factors have also
been responsible for the single most important ingredient in
Mexico's overall growth: exports. In the United States today,
there is great demand for Mexican products, especially consider-
ing that Mexican products are now less expensive than they
were just over a year ago.
As a result of the weaker yet more competitive peso, Mexi-
can exports to the United States will continue to grow over the
next year. Mexico's trade surplus with the United States
25. Where applicable, the analysis will also address developments in these
emerging areas as they may apply to countries in Latin America other than Mexico.
26. Julia Preston, Mexican Peso Dives, as Economy Treads Water, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1995, at Cl; Paul B. Carroll, Peso May Feel Pressure Through 1995, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A20; Julia Preston, Mexico Vows Restraint and Market
Yawns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at D6; Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Officials Hope
Budget Political Win Will Aid Peso, J. COM., Nov. 14, 1995, at 3A.
27. Dianne Solis, Americans Grow Ugly in Mexicans' Eyes, WALL ST. J., March
21, 1995, at A16.
28. Dianne Solis, Mexico's Economic Crisis Pushes Unions to Consider Conces-
sionS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at A4; Kevin G. Hall, Mexico's Poor Economic
Report Will Be Tough for Traders to Digest, J. CoM., Nov. 21, 1995, at 3A.
29. Craig Torres, The Banking Disaster in Mexico Whipsaws an Ailing Economy,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at Al.
5151996]
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amounts to approximately $600 million per month and is likely
to continue at that level for some time.30 The total export figure
for Mexican goods in 1995 is predicted to reach $79.2 billion, up
from $60.9 billion in the previous year.31 After the first nine
months of 1995, Mexico enjoyed a $12.2 billion trade surplus
with the United States, compared with a meager $1 billion sur-
plus in 1994.2 This increase represents a 781% jump in
Mexico's favor.3
Furthermore, of the $45.5 billion worth of products Mexico
shipped to the United States during that nine month period,
electrical goods were responsible for $12 billion, vehicle exports
totalled $7 billion, and machinery accounted for $4.6 billion. 4
The U.S. purchase of Mexican vehicle exports increased
42.5%,31 climbing from forty-eight percent in 1994 to eighty
percent in 1995.36
Maquiladora production accounts for a significant portion of
the exported electronic goods generated in Mexico. 37 These
"maquiladoras" are primarily foreign-owned manufacturing and
assembly plants located near the U.S. border that take U.S. and
other foreign components or materials, assemble them into com-
pleted goods, and return them to the United States for resale.
Tiajuana, Mexico now hosts most of the world's major electronic
and television manufacturers, and component suppliers are
moving to the region as well. Between 1995 and 1996, some 160
maquiladora plants are expected to be added to the Mexican
border.38 This expansion will bring the number of maquiladoras
30. Competitive Peso Raises Demand for Mexican Products, J. COM., Dec. 13,
1995, at 5A; George Lerner, Economists See Mexico Making Rebound in '96, J. COM.,
Dec. 27, 1995, at 3A-
31. Id. Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Posts Trade Surplus For 1995; 1st Since '89, J.
CoM., Jan. 23, 1996, at 10A.
32. Competitive Peso Raises Demand for Mexican Products, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. McAllen, supra note 1.
37. Id.; Kevin G. Hall, Predictions Of Maquiladoras' Decline Unfounded, Thanks
to NAFTA, Peso, J. COM., June 9, 1995, at 9A [hereinafter Predictions]; Kevin G.
Hall, Mexican Peso Crisis Creates Mixed Bag for Texas Cites, J. COM., Aug. 16, 1995,
at 5A [hereinafter Mexican Peso Crisis]; Graciela Sevilla, Mexico's Training Program
Pays Off - Skilled Workers Provided for Factories, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 1995,
at C1.
38. Predictions, supra note 37; see also Mexico's Maquiladoras Provide 742,700
Jobs, J. COM., Jan. 12, 1996, at 3A
516 [Vol. 27:3
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to a record high of 2250."9
With such a large increase in the number of exports travel-
ling from Mexico to the United States, especially in the three
areas noted above, accidents involving the use or operation of
these products in the United States will inevitably occur. As
logically follows, it is only a matter of time before claims are
brought in the United States for alleged product defects involv-
ing these Mexican manufactured products. In fact, lawsuits have
already been instituted in the area of environmental liability in
other Latin American countries. 4° Additionally, because many
of these Mexican products are made with U.S. components and
materials, and by subsidiaries or affiliates of U.S. companies,
the liability for these products will extend back to the U.S. par-
ent corporation or entity. Indeed, it is generally in the plaintiffs
best financial interests to join a U.S. parent company in any
products liability suit.
In light of these potential lawsuits, adequate insurance
coverage and risk management techniques will be essential to
U.S. and multinational companies that manufacture and export
goods from Mexico into the United States. Equally as important
to these companies will be "rapid-response" claim investigation
teams, as well as experienced legal counsel capable of adminis-
tering a claims and litigation program at a national level.
Moreover, given that the "duty to warn" is a very important
component of U.S. product liability law,41 companies must scru-
tinize the types and contents of warning labels placed on prod-
ucts exported to the United States. If a product is being market-
ed to a non-English speaking segment of the U.S. population
(e.g., a Spanish-speaking community), consideration must be
given to printing warnings in both English and Spanish.42
39. Predictions, supra note 37.
40. See infra part III.C.
41. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1994); Humphreys v.
General Motors Corp., 839 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1993). Ricardo J. Cata & David
M. Kittredge, A Practical Review of U.S. Product Liability Law, BUS. MEX., June
1995, at 35; Ricardo J. Cata & David M. Kittredge, Legal Defense Is the Best Of-
fense, Bus. MEx., Aug. 1995, at 43.
42. Rosario M. Vignali, Foreign Language Warnings and the Duty to Warn,
RISK MGMT., Apr. 1995, at 83; Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Commerce Officials Set
Product Labeling Rules, J. CoM., Jan. 25, 1996, at 3A. Other components of product
liability claims include design defect and negligent manufacture.
1996] 517
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With tort reform stalled in Congress since the summer of
1995, product liability claims are likely to remain a significant
and costly component in U.S. tort litigation.' Therefore, this
emerging area of liability represents a significant and substan-
tial danger to U.S. companies either manufacturing products in
Mexico or importing goods from Mexico into the United
States.44 In contrast, however, product liability claims are not
yet a major factor in Mexican tort litigation,45 which provides
some relief to manufacturers and their parent companies.
B. Trucking Liability
As of December 18, 1995 under the NAFTA, 4" U.S. and Ca-
nadian truckers were scheduled to gain operating rights
throughout Mexico's six border states.47 In exchange, Mexican
truckers were permitted to operate in California, Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas." Trucks transport approximately eighty-five
percent of all trade between the United States and Mexico,49
43. Jeff A. Taylor, What Happened to Tort Reform?, INv. Bus. DAILY, Nov. 17,
1995, at 1A Dave Lenckus, Tort System Is in Need of Repair, BUS. INS., Nov. 27,
1995, at 3; Mark A. Hoffman, Hopes Alive on Product Liability, Bus. INS., Jan. 22,
1996, at 7.
44. Juries Send a $1.3 Billion Message - Malpractice, Faulty Products Domi-
nate Largest Awards of 1995, Bus. INS., Jan. 22, 1996, at 3; Edward Felsenthal, In-
crease in Size of Jury Awards May Spur Efforts to Alter System, WALL ST. J., Jan.
5, 1996, at BS.
45. Maria Casas Lopez, How the Stakes Can Change, Bus. MEx., Oct. 1995, at
47.
46. Tim Shorrock, Pena Puts Brakes on Trucks at Borders, J. CoM., Dec. 18,
1995, at 1A, Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Delays Giving Mexican Trucks Freer
Travel in the U.S. Border States, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1995, at A2; David E.
Sanger, NAFTA's Next Phase Is Delayed by Fears About Truck Safety, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1995, at Al; David E. Sanger, U.S. and Mexico Try to Halt NAFTA Provi-
sion on Trucking, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1995, at A9; Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Truckers
Get a Break on In-State Registration in Texas, J. COM., Dec. 5, 1995, at 3B.
47. However, on December 18, 1995 the U.S., under significant labor and politi-
cal pressure, announced at least a forty-five day delay in the implementation of this
essential NAFTA provision. Presently, truckers from either country cannot travel
beyond a twenty-six mile limit across their respective borders. U.S. and Mexico Try
to Halt NAFTA Provision on Trucking, supra note 46; Greenberger, supra note 46;
Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Protests Border Action, J. COM., Dec. 20, 1995, at IA; John
Maggs, U.S.-Mexican Trucking Disagreement Escalates as Trade Ties Break Down, J.
COM., Dec. 22, 1995, at 2A; Kevin G. Hall, U.S., Mexico Play Game of Tit for Tat in
NAFTA Row, J. COM., Jan. 31, 1996, at 1A [hereinafter Tit for Tat in Nafta Row].
48. U.S. and Mexico Try to Halt NAFTA Provision on Trucking, supra note 46;
Greenberger, supra note 46; Maggs, supra note 47; Hall, supra note 47.
49. Souter, supra note 1.
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resulting in revenues of $3.25 billion per year.0 Presently,
eighty percent of this trade moves primarily through Laredo,
Texas.5
U.S. motor carriers may purchase liability insurance issued
by Mexican companies while operating in Mexico.52 Corporate
risk managers must be careful, however, as there are differences
in liability insurance coverage if the coverage is bought from
insurers in Mexico rather than the United States. For example,
if all-risk coverage is desired, the corporate manager must spe-
cifically request it, since it is not automatically provided.53
In order to clarify the differences and opportunities of this
emergent or increasing liability, a discussion of the four general
categories of liability and their effect on the trucking industry is
necessary: 1) third-party liability, 2) theft and hijackings, 3)
freight claims, and 4) money laundering liability.
1. Third-Party Liability
Third-party liability in Mexico and other Latin American
nations will have increasing importance to risk managers of
multinational companies doing business in the region, especially
as the region's general population gradually becomes more
aware of their rights to sue for injuries or property damage.5'
With the assistance and counsel of U.S. attorneys, this aware-
ness has begun to develop in Ecuador, Peru, and Chile and is
already present in Argentina.55
The unprecedented surge of foreign firms making huge in-
50. Marilyn L. Lytle, NAFTA Brings Opportunities to Inland Marine Insurers,
BEST'S REV., July 1995, at 46.
51. Kevin G. Hall, Insurance Worries Mexican Truckers, J. COM., November 17,
1995, at IA
52. Souter, supra note 1, at 22. However, under a specific exception to the
NAFTA, U.S. exporters to Mexico may secure U.S. insurance on a U.S. registered
truck transporting goods into Mexico, even during the time the truck is in Mexico.
An American exporter to Mexico can now insure shipments with a U.S. insurer
under its open cargo policy with an American insurer, even when the risk of loss
shifts to a Mexican during transit. Lytle, supra note 50.
53. Souter, supra note 1; Margo D. Belier, Texas Official Signals Concerns
About Mexico Truckers, J. COM., Feb. 14, 1996, at 11A.
54. Alice Oshins, Latin America Stages First Risk Management Conference, RISK
MGMT., Jan. 1995, at 6.
55. Pedro Zournadijan, Good Prospects in Argentina, MERCADO ASEGURADOR,
Sept. 1995, at 26, 28.
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vestments in Mexico and other Latin American countries16 will
encourage the growth of insurance in areas such as product
liability, environmental liability, trucking liability, kidnap and
ransom, political risk insurance, and even in niche markets such
as accounting, legal, and medical malpractice. 7 As a result of
massive foreign investment in that region, there will be a tre-
mendous increase in insurance placed in Latin America. In fact,
by the year 2025, emerging markets (in which Latin America
56. In December 1995, a group of U.S., Canadian, European, and Asian com-
panies pledged to invest $6.3 billion in Mexico during 1996. Of this, $3.45 billion
was pledged by American and Canadian companies, $1.59 billion by Europeans, and
$1.18 billion by Asian companies. Companies involved included General Electric,
Bayer, Bechtel, El Paso Natural Gas, AT&T, GTE Data Services, Amoco, Hyundai,
Mitsubishi, Sony, BMW, and France T6l6com. Dillon, supra note 24. Moreover,
Mexico's announcement in November 1995 of its intention to open the natural gas
sector to private transmission, distribution, and storage is likely to encourage addi-
tional foreign investment. Kevin G. Hall, Mexico to Unveil Rules Opening Gas Sector,
J. COM., Nov. 8, 1995, at 6B. Additionally, Mexico's announcement of its intention to
privatize its airports should increase foreign investment. Mexico Forms Panel to
Privatize Airports, J. COM., Feb. 13, 1996, at 4A
Further increasing investment was Mexico's October 1995 announcement that
it would sell ten petrochemical complexes consisting of sixty-one plants. Kevin G.
Hall, Mexico Will Begin Bidding Process for Petrochemical Plants Next Week, J.
CoM., Oct. 24, 1995, at 6B; Anthony de Palma, Mexico Renews Its Intention to Sell
Parts of Oil Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at C4; see also Untapped Latin
Gas Fields Lure N. American, European Investors, supra note 24. Recent interest
expressed by U.S. railroads in investing in and expanding the Mexican railroad
system will also increase the amount of U.S. investment in Mexico. Kevin G. Hall &
Rip Watson, U.S. Railroads Say Plans for Mexico Unaltered by Terms of Privatiza-
tion, J. COM., Nov. 15, 1995, at 2B.
Latin America will require as much as $50 billion per year in investment
capital for a variety of infrastructure projects, such as telecommunications, power
plants, roads, water ways, airports, railways, and water treatment facilities. D.
Pellard, Latin America Opens the Door for Trade and Growth, RISK MGMT., June
1995, at 8; William R. Fadul, Trade Barriers Tumble in Latin America, J. COM., Oct.
30, 1995, at 7A. Foreign investors have invested into Argentina alone some $30
billion in infrastructure projects, either fully financed or "in the pipeline." Argentina
Becomes Expert in Privatization of Industry, supra note 24.
Furthermore, Brazil has raised $13 billion since 1990 by selling state-owned
companies. Cardoso's Ambition: Economic Makeover, supra note 24. A number of U.S.
chemical and power-generating firms have also targeted the region for investment.
Latin America Lures U.S. Chemical Firms, supra note 24; Utility Privatization Elec-
trifies Bolivia, supra note 24. Likewise, hundreds of companies are jockeying for
position in the telecommunications industry in Latin America. As Telecom Changes
Sweep Region, Competition Is King, supra note 24.
57. John Jennings, Emerging Markets Seen Fueling Insurance Growth, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Dec. 4, 1995, at 31; Brian Cox, U.S. Insurers Scramble to Sell Cov-
erage in Mexico, NAVL UNDERWRITER, Jan. 16, 1995, at 3; Margo D. Beller, U.S. In-
surers, Brokers Making Chile Their Base for S. American Growth, J. COM., Apr. 18,
1995, at 7A-
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has a significant presence) will account for more than fifty per-
cent of the total free-world insurance premium income. 8
Thus, it is this enormous increase in trade59 and invest-
ment in Latin America that will fuel the region's increased
awareness of litigation as a recourse for personal injuries or
property damage. Eventually, Latin American countries will
become more litigious, and U.S. courts may begin to enforce
foreign judgments if they comply with minimum standards of
due process and notice under U.S. law." Additionally, legal
conditions in Mexico and throughout the region are likely to
change because judgments in property damage or personal inju-
ry cases brought in those countries will be significantly higher
than in past years.8' Moreover, although dependent on the facts
and circumstances surrounding a particular case, it is increas-
ingly conceivable that a suit - arising from personal injuries
suffered by a Mexican or Latin American national inflicted by a
U.S. based entity - may be brought in the United States. This
scenario is even more plausible if the injury occurs in a Mexican
border state.
Barring delays, by the year 2000 the United States and
Mexico will lift all cross-border trade restrictions between the
two countries.6 2 U.S. trucking firms, using their own drivers
and equipment, will be able to travel anywhere in Mexico, while
Mexican trucks will be able to deliver goods anywhere in the
United States.' This cross-border transportation is estimated
to reach six million truckloads per year.64 The NAFTA will not,
however, place restrictions on truck carriage of domestic car-
58. Jennings, supra note 57, at 32.
59. Richard Lawrence, The Hot Export Markets, J. COM., Jan. 8, 1996, at 8.
60. John Stites, Going Forward with Global Investments, RISK MGMT., Nov.
1995, at 12. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894); Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
61. David S. Macari, Casualty Insurance and Reinsurance Development as a
Result of NAFTA, Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Latin American/Caribbean
Regional Office (presented at the Encuentro InterAmericano de Reaseguro, Miami,
Florida, May 1995). According to Mauricio Kitaigorodzki, General Coordinator of
Mercado Asegurador, Buenos Aires, insurance companies in Argentina face an esti-
mated 140,000 lawsuits arising from automobile accidents and work-related accidents
annually.
62. Souter, supra note 1; Lytle, supra note 50, at 47. The Mexican states ini-
tially involved were Baja California, Sonora, Ciciwawa, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo
Le6n, and Tamaulipas.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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U.S. drivers, however, are unfamiliar with Mexican driving
conditions, which are vastly different from those in the United
States. Mexico's highway system is significantly smaller than
the interstate system of the United States, and some eighty
percent of the vehicles on Mexican roads are uninsured.6 Addi-
tionally, although the primary Mexican toll roads are safer and
in better condition, they are very expensive on which to travel.
This may force truckers to use the minor roads, which are wind-
ing, badly maintained, and lacking street signs, and will result
in a higher number of accidents.67 Thus, third-party liability is
an area in which trucking-related claims are likely to increase.
2. Theft and Hijacking
In 1994, Mexican police reported 270 truck hijackings on
Mexico's federal highways, 8 which does not include many more
thefts on less-protected local roads." Generally, there has been
an increase in both crime and the sophistication of the robbers
who commit them. 70 Additionally, the economic crisis of the
past year augmented this problem.7' Of these crimes, hijacking
and theft remain the biggest source of losses for truckers and
their marine insurers. In 1994, for example, Chubb paid one
million pesos ($176,000 at the May 1995 exchange rate) in cargo
losses, of which ninety percent were attributed to hijacking.72
While insurance coverage is an essential component of pro-
tection in this area, a well-thought risk-management plan is also
necessary. As a preliminary measure, trucking companies must
65. Id.
66. Bill Mongelluzo, List of 16 Requirements Outlines Rules for U.S. Truckers in
Mexico, J. CoM., Dec. 5, 1995, at 3B; Margo D. Belier, Mexico Safety Factors Worry
U.S. Truck Insurers, J. COM., Jan. 30, 1996, at 9A_
67. Ryan Myhre, Up, Up and a Way's to Go, Bus. MEx., Nov. 1995, at 46;
Stites, supra note 60; Souter, supra note 1; Insurers Warn of Truck Risk in Mexico,
J. COM., May 15, 1995, at 1A; Insurers Face Problems with Mexican Theft, Peso, J.
COM., May 2, 1995, at 6A-
68. Stites, supra note 60.
69. Id.
70. Andrew A. Reding, Mexico's Law and Order Crisis, J. COM., Aug. 1, 1995,
at 8A.
71. Sergio Sarmiento, My Encounter with Mexico City's Crime Wave, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 12, 1996, at All.
72. Insurers Warn of Truck Risk in Mexico, supra note 67.
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insist that their drivers use toll roads and remove any logos
from their trucks which might indicate the contents of a ship-
ment. When a theft does occur, truckers must obtain from local
police a robbery report, which is required when presenting a
claim to an insurance company.73 U.S. carriers must know their
Mexican partners and make sure the partner has the proper
financial resources not only to provide terminal security, but to
screen their drivers, as internal collusion is one of the biggest
problems in this area.7
In Brazil, which suffers from the same problem, truck carri-
ers and their insurers implemented spy-in-the-sky technology,
developed by the U.S. Armed Forces, to monitor vehicle loca-
tion.7" The satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) can
locate a linked vehicle within ninety-nine feet of its true position
and establish two-way communication within thirty seconds."'
This system, costing approximately twenty dollars a day per
vehicle in Brazil, is relatively inexpensive protection compared
with the risk of losses.77 In recent years the security costs asso-
ciated with theft and hijacking in Brazil were one dollar for
every ten dollars of receipts generated." Mexico also uses the
GPS technology,79 which any carrier should consider when de-
veloping a security program for shipping in Mexico. These risk
management techniques, as well as adequate insurance cover-
age, are indispensable elements in the overall effort to reduce
liability.
73. Souter, supra note 1.
74. Insurers Face Problems with Mexican Theft, Peso, supra note 67.
75. James Bruce, U.S. Sky-Spy System Helps Brazil Battle Hijackers, J. COM.,
Nov. 30, 1995, at 1A. In Brazil more than eighty percent of commerce moves by
truck. Hijackers, the plague of the industry, target surgical equipment, pharmaceuti-
cals, stereo systems, domestic appliances, and cigarettes. Hijacking-related insurance
payments in 1994 amounted to $215 million, resulting in a premium increase of
150% in 1993-94, and another fifty percent in the first half of 1995. Generating in
excess of $30 billion annually, Brazil has more than 800 trucking operators, and two
million trucks. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Roberto Ceniceros, Mexican Market Remains Soft, BUS. INS., Jan. 15, 1996,
at 40. However, thieves quickly learned how to disable such devices. Id.
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3. Freight Claims
Freight claims are another area of increasing liability to
companies doing business in Mexico and other Latin American
countries. The growing number of cargo-related crimes in Mexico
and Brazil will likely spread to other Central and South Ameri-
can countries in the next few years. The frequency and severity
of these crimes usually correlate to the economic state of the
particular country in addition to the degree of social problems
and corruption within the various government agencies respon-
sible for trade and cargo matters. These problems are not unique
to Mexico and Brazil. Other Latin American countries meet
these "threshold" requirements,"° and, as such, the problem will
not remain confined to Mexico and Brazil.
While freight claims liability is a major concern to the
trucking industry, liability is not limited to only that mode of
transportation. The amount of air cargo shipped from the United
States to Latin America is tremendous."s With the largest num-
ber of cargo flights and U.S. cargo carriers, Brazil currently has
the greatest potential for profit.8 2 Like air transportation, ocean
cargo shipments between the United States and Latin America,
especially Brazil and Mexico, have flourished in recent years. 3
80. Paul B. Carroll, Mexicans Are Skeptical of Reform Despite Efforts to End
Corruption, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, at A10; Diana J. Schemo, Rio Residents
Protest Crime and Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at All. Diana J. Schemo,
Top Politician Gunned Down in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at A6; Sam
Dillon, Mexico Takes Aim at Craft, but Holds Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at
A4; Sam Dillon, Mexican Police Go Straight (Now That's News!), N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1995, at A4; Patti Lane, Banana Workers Return to Job After Massacre, J. COM.,
Sept. 27, 1995, at 5A; Diana J. Schemo, Brazilian Squatters Fall in Deadly Police
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al; Matt Moffett, Venezuela Is Suffering, Its
Economy Strangled by Too Many Controls, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at Al; James
Bruce, Scandals Seen Spurring Brazilian Transport Reform, J. COM., July 10, 1995,
at 3B; Calvin Sims, A Step-Up Terror Campaign in Peru Shows the Shinning Path
'Is Not Dead Yet,' N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1995, at A5; Pamela Mercer, Emergency
Declared in Colombia to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1995.
81. Lisa Burgess, U.S. Airlines Grab Up Latin American Routes, J. COM., Nov.
3, 1995, at IA; William Armbruster, U.S. Air Cargo Companies Looking South, J.
COM., Nov. 1, 1995, at IA; William Armbruster, A Slice of Latin American Pie, J.
COM., Oct. 30, 1995, at 6; Charles W. Thurston, Latin Airports Struggle to Upgrade,
J. COM., Oct. 30, 1995, at 10.
82. See sources supra note 81.
83. Michael Fabey, Container Trade Surges Between U.S. and South America, J.
COM., July 12, 1995, at 5C; Kevin G. Hall, Privatized Veracruz Terminal Makes
Changes on Many Fronts, J. COM., Sept. 21, 1995, at 12A; Texas Ports Boost Their
Efforts to Snare Trade, J. COM., Dec. 13, 1995, at 6A; Bright Signs Dot the Horizon
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Major ports in the United States experienced a 143% increase in
container shipments to Brazil, and trade growth in the South
American shipping lanes is expected to continue."
Air cargo shipments, however, are not necessarily advanta-
geous over ground transportation, as many problems exist in the
air cargo industry as well. In Brazil, for example, customs in-
spections take so long and secure storage is so limited that air
freight could sit on the tarmac of Sao Paulo's airport for extend-
ed periods. Entire shipments can be held up for weeks or
months, and packages are often lost in enigmatic government
facilities. Corruption in inspections and warehousing procedures
remains a major problem in this aspect of trade. s5
Ocean cargo shipping is also problematic in Latin America.
Piracy of goods occurs at the dockside and port warehouses in
Brazil.8 Even more disturbing is the limited and sometimes
nonexistent effort of the authorities to control it. 7
Many U.S. shippers are surprised, however, when they dis-
cover the differences between United States and other Latin
American legal systems as they pertain to freight claims. In
Mexico, for example, the law does not recognize the concept of
contract of carriage and limits the time allowed for filing freight
claims and lawsuits for cargo loss and damage.88 Under current
Mexican law, in the absence of a higher declared value, a
carrier's responsibility is limited to an amount equal to fifteen
days of minimum wages in Mexico's Federal District for each
metric ton (or for shipments weighing over 441 pounds, but less
than 2204 pounds). 9 Claim payments for shipments weighing
less than 441 pounds are limited to four days of minimum sala-
ry.9" As of November, 1995, the minimum daily wage in the
for Cargo and Cruises, J. COM., Dec. 14, 1995, at 4B.
84. See sources supra note 83.
85. Kevin G. Hall, Brazil Air-Cargo Boom Proves Mixed Blessing, J. COM., Nov.
2, 1995, at 1A.
86. Peter M. Tirschwell, Ship Lines Protest an Invasion of Piracy in Brazil's
Ports, J. COM., Apr. 17, 1995, at 1A; Michael Fabey, Polluters Over Pirates, J. COM.,
Jan. 4, 1996, at 3A.
87. See sources supra note 86.
88. Gregory S. Johnson, Liability Woes, Flood of Rules Plague Cross-Border
Shippers Under NAFTA, J. COM., Nov. 15, 1995, at 2B.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Federal District was only two dollars and forty cents."'
To solve these discrepancies between legal systems, the
United States, Mexico, and Canada attempted to forge an agree-
ment on uniform liability. Unfortunately, the uniform liability
code, which the parties expected to create in October 1995, never
materialized.92 As a result, three different liability programs
remain in place under the NAFTA: 1) the full U.S. liability, 2)
the two Canadian dollars per pound applicable to Canadian
truckers, and 3) Mexico's three U.S. cents per pound. 3
In order to minimize the freight loss liability that may re-
sult to their companies, risk managers need to pay close atten-
tion to freight claims liability and to the applicable law in the
different jurisdictions. Efforts to adequately plan for the filing of
freight claims must be integrated into the anticipation of and
planning for freight theft and hijacking and the reduction of that
liability.
4. Money Laundering Liability
The emergent area of money laundering liability applies
mainly to the U.S.-Mexico trucking industry, but it could also
pertain to ocean cargo or air freight. With the NAFTA set to
open U.S.-Mexican borders to trucking sometime in the near
future, drug enforcement agencies have growing concerns that
cross-border trade will be targeted by narcotics traffickers seek-
ing smoother trade flows.9" Early in the next century an esti-
mated 10,000 to 15,000 trucks will cross into the United States
from Mexico on a daily basis.95 Currently, as much as seventy
percent of the cocaine entering the United States comes across
the Mexican border.9" According to the DEA and U.S. Customs,
in 1994 forty percent of the drug seizures and twenty percent of
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Kevin G. Hall, NAFTA Border Opening Set Today, J. CoM., Dec. 18, 1995,
at 1A.
94. Kevin G. Hall, Transporters in Cross Fire of U.S. Drug Crackdown, J. COM.,
Sept. 26, 1995, at 3A [hereinafter Transporters in Cross Fire]; Mexico Seizes Drugs
Headed for Texas, J. COM., Feb. 13, 1996, at 2B.
95. More Carriers Seek Cross-Border Authority, J. COM., Feb. 13, 1996, at 2B.
96. Id. See also Sam Dillon, Mexico Arrests a Top Suspect in Drug Trade, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1996, at Al.
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the cash seizures by the DEA originated in Texas."
Nor is the increased drug-trafficking activity limited to
smuggling drugs into the United States. Just as drug merchants
need to move their product into the United States, they need to
transfer their earnings south and convert them into pesos. Put
in more delicate terms, they need to "launder" their earnings.9 8
The Cali drug cartel is reportedly funneling billions of dollars in
drug profits back to Latin America through a wide variety of
American companies - large and small, witting and unwit-
ting.9
9
In a single investigation conducted in New York, the Feder-
al Customs Service identified 105 American companies that
accepted drug money for electronics, auto parts, and other goods
shipped to Colombia.'00 In October 1995, President Clinton di-
rected the U.S. government to identify front companies involved
in money laundering and freeze their assets.1 1 The Treasury
Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network reported
that wholesale representatives of many American companies, in-
cluding General Electric, Microsoft, Apple Computer and Gener-
al Motors, sold goods to importers they did not know were fronts
for laundering drug proceeds. 102
A 1995 U.S. embassy report singled out Mexico as the larg-
est money laundering center in Latin America.0 3 The report
stated that Mexico's financial system, serving the Colombian
drug barons and the Mexican cartels, was particularly vulnera-
ble to money laundering by the narcotics trade.' In the drug
trade, the Mexicans appear to be doing better business than the
Colombians. 05 In response, Mexico unveiled a twenty-nine
point reform plan for the Attorney General's office, creating an
elite anti-drug unit, promoting greater coordination with the
97. Transporters in Cross Fire, supra note 94.
98. Clifford Krauss & Douglas Frantz, Cali Drug Cartel Using U.S. Business to
Launder Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al; Sam Dillon, Speed Carries Mexican
Drug Dealer to the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at A6.
99. Krauss & Frantz, supra note 98.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Leslie Crawford, Mexico Prepares Cash Laundering Law, FIN. TIMES, May 4,
1995, at 8; Dillon, supra note 98.
5271996]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
armed forces, and eliminating multiple levels of bureaucracy,
making it easier to avoid corruption and prosecute traffick-
ers. 10
With a strong anti-crime response coming from the United
States and Mexico, U.S. companies operating in Mexico and
Latin America, especially those using ground transportation,
must be diligent in ascertaining who their true partners are and
how they screen their drivers. There is also a pressing need for
companies to avoid being entrapped in a money laundering sting
operation which would be very disruptive to operations, expen-
sive, damaging to the company's reputation, and might possibly
give rise to criminal liability of corporate management.
C. Environmental Liability
Over the next thirty years environmental liability claims
will reach $40 billion, with clean-up costs being a major compo-
nent of that amount. 7 Of 1100 insurance companies, approxi-
mately forty will shoulder eighty percent of these losses, making
them vulnerable to major restructuring, insolvency, and lower
financial ratings. 08 Although these figures are not specific to
Latin America, that region is emerging as an active source of
environmental liability for multinational companies. Such liabili-
ty is already evident in the region, as the following case studies
make clear.
1. Peru's Fight for Fresh Air
The town of Lo is located near the Pacific Ocean in the
southern part of Peru. For the past thirty years Ilo has been the
site of the Southern Peru Copper Corporation, controlled by
three American companies - Asarco, Inc., the Phelps Dodge
Corporation, and the Marmon Group. Environmentalists report
that the plant's smelter releases 2000 tons of sulfur dioxide into
the air daily, exceeding the limit imposed in the United States
by ten to fifteen times."°9 Southern Peru Copper asserts that it
106. Mexico Undertakes Own Anti-Narcotics Measures, J. COM., Sept. 26, 1995, at
3A.
107. Margo D. Belier, Environmental Claims Will Soar, J. COM., Oct. 30, 1995,
at 15A.
108. Id.
109. Calvin Sims, In Peru, A Fight for Fresh Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at
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has always operated within the confines of Peruvian law; Peru
does not set limits on emission rates.
However, seeking damages for what they allege to be de-
cades of environmental harm, residents of Ilo, with American
representation, filed suit against Southern Peru Copper, its own-
ers, and its creditors in a Texas court.11° The suit alleges that
the company destroyed a twelve mile stretch of coastline by
dumping thirty million metric tons of untreated mining wastes
into the Pacific Ocean annually."' If successful, the suit could
return damages against Southern Peru Copper totalling millions
of dollars for health problems and clean-up costs.
2. Ecuador's Pesticide Suit
Naranjal is a banana plantation town in the southern part
of Ecuador's Pacific coast. In 1972, the plantations began using a
pesticide, dibromo-chloropropane (DBCP), to kill a microscopic
worm that, if left untreated, could have destroyed the banana
crop allocated for exportation to the United States. In 1977
DBCP was found to cause sterility in men." This resulted in
an immediate ban of DBCP in California and sharply restricted
its use elsewhere in the United States."' It was eventually
banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979, but
American-based food growers continued to use the chemical in
countries lacking the U.S. standards of environmental, legal,
and occupational protections." 4 Allegedly, the product contin-
ued to be shipped to Ecuador through 1981."'
Today, in a class-action suit, some 25,000 workers from
twelve developing countries, including Ecuador, allege that the
use of the fumigant caused sterility in men."6 The manufac-
turers deny sending the pesticide overseas after 1979. They also
C1. Phelps Dodge is also involved in a Chilean copper mine project. Phelps Dodge
Looks for Growth at Chilean Copper Mine, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at 25.
110. Sims, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Diana J. Schemo, Pesticide from U.S. Kills the Hopes of Fruit Pickers in the
Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at A8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Corporate defendants named in the suit include Dow Chemical, Shell
Oil, Occidental Petroleum, Del Monte Fruit, Chiquita Brands and Dole Food. Id.
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maintain that labels were printed in Spanish advising the use of
protective gear and warning of the danger of sterility.
117
While the plaintiffs' American lawyers will have to overcome
significant legal obstacles to succeed, the potential liability in
this case, both to the defendants and their insurers is in the
millions of dollars. If the suit proceeds, even without a plaintiffs'
award the costs of defense and burden of discovery to the defen-
dant companies will be staggering.
3. Going After Big Oil
From 1972 to 1990, the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline carried
1.4 billion barrels of crude oil, generating hundreds of millions of
dollars for Texaco, America's fourth largest oil firm."8 Environ-
mentalists assert that in the process the pipeline caused parts of
the country's most biologically rich area to become a toxic waste
dump." Residents along the pipeline's path claim that breath-
ing the oil-polluted air and drinking and bathing in oil-black-
ened waters has increased their susceptibility to cancer. Texaco
no longer operates in Ecuador.' °
Residents along the pipeline's path have filed a class-action
suit in a New York district court and seek to recover $1.5 billion
from Texaco. The case, as reported in the Miami Herald, "is part
of a trend in which international activists are forming networks
to protect wilderness left vulnerable by uncaring, cash-strapped
or corrupt governments... " and "is part of a growing effort by
environmentalists in the United States and developing countries
to make multinational firms answer to higher stan-
dards .... 12
Pending talks between Texaco and Ecuadorean officials, the
court stayed the suit in the winter of 1994. However, when
plaintiffs rejected the pact proposed as a result of these talks, a
U.S. Magistrate allowed the case to proceed in June 1995.122
117. Id.
118. Katherine Ellison, Activists Take on Big Oil to Protect the Wilderness, MI-
AMI HERALD, Aug. 20, 1995, at IA.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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4. The Shrimp Farm Case
A suit filed in 1994 in a South Florida Circuit Court"2 al-
leges that from the late 1980s to the early 1990s a large number
of Ecuadorean farmers, including banana growers, began using a
variety of agricultural chemicals, including products known as
Tilt, Atrazine, and Calixin, to combat various maladies which
were affecting the crops.2
The suit further alleges that CIBA-GEIGY Limited recom-
mended and sold the fungicide Tilt and the herbicide Atrazine,
which were imported into Ecuador and used there by banana
growers." s Furthermore, the suit also alleges that Del Monte
Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. and Del Monte Fresh Produce Compa-
ny provided consultants who recommended the use of these
chemicals in the Ecuadorean banana plantations.
2 1
An amended fourth-party complaint, filed by Lango-Taura
S.A., a shrimp farm operator in Ecuador, alleges that the use of
the chemicals caused a substantial reduction in the productivity
of Lango-Taura S.A.'s shrimp farm, caused a significant increase
in the mortality of the shrimp, reduced the size of the shrimp
produced, and caused undesirable symptoms and characteristics
in the shrimp which adversely affect their life expectancy, size,
and marketability.'27
The amended complaint seeks monetary damages from the
fourth-party defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Incorpo-
rated, Del Monte Fresh Produce Company, CIBA-GEIGY Limit-
ed, CIGA-GEIGY Corporation, Basf Aktiengesellschaft, and
International Fertilizer Limited on the basis of negligence, de-
sign defects, known hazards of the products, or failure to test
the products, all of which allegedly caused significant monetary
damages to Lango-Taura S.A.1
21
123. The Fish Peddler, Inc. v. Pink Star Corp., No. 94-10139-27-FRANZA (Circuit
Ct., Broward County, Fla.). The suit has brought in, as fourth-party defendants, Del
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., Del Monte Fresh Produce Company, CIBA-GEIGY
Limited, CIBA-GEIGY Corporation, Basf Aktiengesellschaft, and International Fer-
tilizer Ltd. Id.
124. Id., amended fourth-party complaint, at 8.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9.
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5. The Fight Over Gas Pipelines
Chilean environmentalists vigorously oppose a proposed
giant natural gas pipeline to be built over the Andes which, they
assert, will cross an active earthquake fault and carry its highly
combustible contents only yards from people's homes.29 The
pipeline, which would pass over the highest mountains in this
hemisphere, will carry ten million cubic meters of liquid natural
gas from Mendoza, Argentina to Santiago, Chile each day.30
The environmentalists further allege that the pipeline, to be
built by Canada's Nova Corporation and Chilean electrical utili-
ty, Chilgerer at a cost of U.S. $300 million, will not comply with
safety laws in Canada and will require slashing down rare,
protected native forests.'1
3
Although no lawsuit has yet been filed, this scenario demon-
strates the level of environmental awareness and aggressiveness
that the Latin American general population has developed
against multinational corporations. Additionally, Chilean media
coverage of the pipeline controversy has steadily grown. If the
environmentalists fail in their present efforts to halt this project,
legal action may be the next option they consider.
3 2
6. Going After PEMEX
In January 1996, demonstrators led by Mexico's Democratic
Revolution Party (PRD) blocked dozens of oil wells belonging to
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Protestors asserted that
PEMEX's wells, in the Tabasco region of Mexico's Gulf Coast,
had polluted the soils and the waters of the surrounding rivers,
129. Chilean Environmentalists Rip Standards for Proposed Pipeline over the
Andes, J. COm., Oct. 6, 1995, at 5B.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. An incident in Guyana involving another Canadian company, Omai Gold
Mines, Ltd., clearly illustrates the threat of legal action. Omai Gold Mines owns one
of South America's largest mines, located in Guyana. In January 1996, the Guyanese
government authorized the mine to reopen following a five-month shutdown caused
by a cyanide leak, contaminating the Omai Creek and the Essequibo River. On be-
half of residents of Guyana effected by the disaster, a Montreal environmental
group, Public Interest Research Associates, said it would probably sue the company
in the province of Quebec, Canada, where the majority owner, Cambior Inc., is head-
quartered, to block the reopening. Aviva Freudmann, OK to Reopen Won't Mean End
of Troubles for Mine in Guyana, J. COM., Jan. 11, 1996, at 5B.
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lakes, and communities and that fishing ceased to be one of the
principal sources of subsistence because of the alleged pollu-
tion.1" The demonstrators sought benefits from PEMEX as
well as restoration of the environment."M As of mid-February,
PEMEX was claiming daily losses of more than five billion pesos
(U.S. $700,000) as a consequence of the protests and denial of
access to the wells.
135
These events signify the Mexicans' increased awareness of
industrial pollution and their right to seek redress from per-
ceived ecological damage. As Mexico is planning to privatize fifty
petrochemical plants in addition to natural gas distribution
operations,3 ' multinational corporations planning to invest in
former PEMEX operations must be diligent in investigating any
existing environmental harms, so as to avoid costly claims that
could be asserted against the investors for pre-existing environ-
mental damage.
Although most Latin American countries have already en-
acted environmental legislation, not all enforce these laws with
the same zeal.3 7 In Argentina, for example, environmental reg-
ulations are expected to play an increasingly important role in
foreign investment decisions. Recent legal developments there
revamped the legislative framework, tightening the legal protec-
tion of the environment.l38
Brazil recently enacted several laws in the area of environ-
mental protection, resulting in a substantial number of cases
being brought in the Brazilian courts.3 9 Under present Brazil-
ian laws, polluters are subject to joint and several strict liabili-
ty." Thus, a polluter may be liable regardless of knowledge,
133. Sam Dillon, Mexican Protest Blockades Oil Wells in a Gulf State, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1996, at C7.
134. Id.
135. Martin Langfield, Zedillo Launches Energy Plan, Slams Protests, J. COM.,
Feb. 14, 1996, at 5B; PEMEX Acusa De Sabotaje A Izquierdistas [PEMEX Accuses
the Leftists of Sabotage] EL NUEvO HERALD, Feb. 16, 1996, at lB.
136. Anthony de Palma, Mexico Renews Its Intention to Sell Parts of Oil Monop-
oly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at C4.
137. Environmental Law and Policy in Latin America, Osvaldo R.I. Agatiello, ed.,
(Baker & McKenzie) Miami, 1995.
138. R. Eugenia Bec & Horacio J. Franco, Environmental Issues for Foreign In-
vestors, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., July 31, 1995, at 9.
139. Environmental Protection in Brazil, in 1 LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL DEVELOP-
MENTS BULLETIN No. 3 (Baker & McKenzie), Oct. 1993, at 5.
140. Id. at 8.
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fault, degree of care, or intent. Additionally, the "deep pocket"
doctrine applies, where each party is liable for all parties' liabili-
ties.'" Another extremely important concern is that a
polluter's successor or anyone contributing to the environmental
damage is also liable for damages.1
2
Although critics recently asserted that Brazilian environ-
mental laws are not being enforced as aggressively as they
should be,'" a multinational corporation participating in
Brazil's huge privatization program must be aware of this poten-
tial liability.'" It should proceed under the assumption that
the laws in the books may and probably will be enforced. It
would simply be too costly to believe otherwise.
Chile's Environmental Act of March 1994'" creates envi-
ronmental liability for violators acting negligently or malicious-
ly'4 and establishes a legal presumption of liability for the
person violating environmental standards.4 7 The burden of
proof as to negligence or malice rests on the violator, who must
disprove the allegations.'"
The Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a
three member commission formed under the NAFTA,149 over-
141. Sarah Goddard, Deep Pockets Beware, BUS. INS., Oct. 9, 1995, at 77.
142. Environmental Law and Policy in Latin America, supra note 137, at 31.
143. Diana J. Schemo, Amazon Is Burning Again, as Furiously as Ever, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at A3.
144. Environmental Law and Policy in Latin America, supra note 137, at 52.
Multinationals purchasing existing industrial facilities in Latin America must be very
careful to conduct all the necessary environmental soil studies, as pre-existing con-
tamination could, under some countries' laws, such as Brazil's, be charged to a suc-
cessor owner. In Colombia, for example, the National Liberation Army and the Revo-
lution Armed Forces of Colombia have been responsible, through years of bombings,
for thousands of barrels of crude oil spilled into the environment. James Brooke,
Colombia Oil Spills Net Fines for All but Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at A2.
The danger becomes even more threatening now that U.S. chemical and oil firms are
moving into Latin America. Friedland & Fritsch, supra note 24; Allanna Sullivan,
Where Others Feared to Drill, One Group Hits a Gusher of Oil, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
1996, at Al; Bruce Vail, ICI Americas Sees Latin America As Primary Target for
Expansion, J. COM., Feb. 20, 1996, at 7A.
145. Environmental Law and Policy in Latin America, supra note 137, at 46.
146. Id. at 52.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. NAFTA - Related Agreements, BUS. MEX., special ed., 1995, at 79; Kevin
G. Hall, NAFTA Countries Agree to Focus on PCB Elimination, J. COM., Oct. 17,
1995, at 6B [hereinafter Focus on PCB Elimination]; Panel's First Case Makes Head-
way, J. COM., Oct. 18, 1995, at 5A.
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sees environmental issues and disputes and has the power to in-
crease the enforcement capabilities of the NAFTA partners,
particularly Mexico. 50
In October 1995, the CEC presented a report to the environ-
mental ministers of the NAFTA countries on the mysterious
water bird kill of 1994, where between 25,000 and 40,000 migra-
tory water birds were killed in Mexico's Silva Reservoir, near
the City of Leon in the central state of Guanajuato. 15' The
CEC recommended that Mexico adopt independent monitoring of
its waste treatment in Central Mexico and create a wildlife
health and disease outbreak surveillance network.
5 2
The CEC's report, submitted against the wishes of the Mexi-
can Environmental Secretariat, signaled that the CEC was a
strong and proactive force to be taken seriously."5 The CEC
has already announced that it will work on a joint action plan to
eliminate PCBs (stable but environmentally harmful chemicals)
from the Mexican environment. The CEC also plans to address
three other potentially harmful pollutants in Mexico, mainly
lead, cadmium, and the pesticide DDT.'"
The CEC is not, however, the only entity working to solve
Mexico's environmental problems. Soon after his inauguration,
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo established the position of
Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisher-
ies. 55 Among other duties, the Secretariat 56 is charged with
150. Federico Ruanova & Carlos Angulo-Parra, Guidelines For Generators of Haz-
ardous Waste, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Feb. 28, 1995, at 20.
151. Panel's First Case Makes Headway, supra note 149.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Focus on PCB Elimination, supra note 149. In January 1996 the Mexican
Environmental Law Center and two other Mexican environmental groups petitioned
the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to study whether Mexico prop-
erly followed its laws in approving a development project for Playa Paraiso in the
State of Quintana Roo, on the island of Cozumel. The three groups are asking for
the CEC's support on the grounds that the builder, Consorcio H, and the transport
and environment ministries failed to assess the impact of the development associated
with the project. Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Groups Question Project, J. CoM., Jan. 19,
1996, at 3A. On February 12, 1996 the CEC agreed to hear testimony on the
Cozumel project and issue a judgment - the first time it had agreed to do so in its
history. Julia Preston, Where Cruise Liners Intrude, NAFTA Tests Waters, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A4.
155. Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries, Bus. MEX.,
special ed., 1995, at 32.
156. Julia Carabias, the former President of Mexico's National Ecology Institute,
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establishing official standards concerning the preservation and
restoration of the environment and ecosystems, sustenance of
natural resources and wildlife, and treatment of waste water
and dangerous materials.'57
The Secretariat, now using the new approach of "polluter
pays," introduced another important reform, risk-based analysis.
A risk-based analysis determines environmental impact on a
fixed maximum permissible limit, taking into consideration the
location of the discharge and the risk involved. Also, the
Secretariat's use of environmental impact statements is likely to
increase." Companies should expect a greater imposition of
fines for violations, often in addition to plant closings and the
collection of surety bonds posted by companies.'59
Moreover, the Secretariat will require maquiladoras to ex-
port any hazardous waste generated from raw materials import-
ed temporarily into Mexico."W Failure to comply with these re-
quirements will also result in plant shutdowns and fines. 6'
Furthermore, maquiladora facilities are mandated to keep a
monthly log of all hazardous waste generated."2 Transfer of
these wastes must be recorded in a log indicating the date of the
transfer, origin, and destination."
Even though Mexico announced in October 1995 that it was
relaxing requirements for environmental impact statements,
multinational companies doing business in Mexico must still
proceed with caution. First, the amount of criticism generated by
the new rules, especially within environmental groups in the
United States, may result in a total or partial reversal from
these relaxed norms.'6 Second, the CEC, as previously dis-
is now the head of the Secretariat.
157. Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries, supra note
155.
158. Gary Newman, In Theory and in Practice, Bus. MEX., special ed., 1995, at
40.
159. Id. at 42.
160. Ruanova & Angulo-Parra, supra note 150, at 23.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 21.
164. Kevin G. Hall, Environment Rule Change Draws Fire in Mexico, J. COM.,
Oct. 26, 1995, at 1A. Under the new rules, which took effect on October 24, 1995,
many companies, including large, pollution-prone industries, will no longer be re-
quired to undertake environmental impact studies. Instead, they will be obligated to
file prevention plans with the federal government. If the INE fails to respond within
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cussed, has given notice of its intent to be a force in the region
rather than just a "paper" agency. Finally, if a U.S. company
operates a maquiladora near the U.S.-Mexican border, resulting
in pollution in the United States, that company could be held
liable under U.S. laws.'65
D. Labor Liability and Business Interruption
Another area of emerging liability for multinationals doing
business in Latin America is that of labor related liability and
associated business interruptions that may arise as a direct
result. In the third quarter of 1995, Mexico's economy contracted
by 9.6%, following an even worse 10.5% contraction in the sec-
ond quarter."6 In the past year, one million jobs disap-
peared" 7 while, at the same time, the Mexican labor force in-
creased by one million workers annually."6 Business and in-
dustry groups have used these events to force concessions from
the unions,"6 which has instilled a dramatic change in how
Mexicans perceive Americans and the American companies now
moving into Mexico. 7'
thirty days of the filing, the company is free to commence plant construction. If they
are located within an industrial park, large businesses will not be required to pro-
duce an environmental impact statement. This exception includes most border area
maquiladoras. Id.
165. Lawsuit over Brain Defects in South Texas Set for Trial - Suit Claims
Toxic Emissions from GM, Others Harmed Children, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Aug. 23, 1995, at B3; James E. Garcia, GM, Companies Settle Lawsuit over Brain
Defects in Valley, AUSTIN AbmERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1995, at B9. These suits
are yet another example of "emerging liabilities." The suits involved allegations that
maquiladora plants operated by GM and two other companies in Matamoros, Mexico,
were creating emissions causing birth defects in babies born across the border in the
Rio Grande Valley, in Cameron County, Texas. While the defendants did not admit
any liability, on the eve of trial the suits were settled for undisclosed amounts. In
1993, suits filed in Texas district court initially named eighty-eight owners of ap-
proximately thirty-five factories in Matamoros as defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that
the air pollution drifted over the border and caused birth defects such as spina
bifida and other neural tube defects. Over the past two years, all defendants have
settled for amounts ranging from $100,000 to $2 million. Id.
166. Craig Torres & Paul B. Carroll, Mexico Says Economy Contracted 9.6%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at All.
167. Id.
168. The Economic Situation in Mexico, N. AM. INS. BULL., Deloitte & Touche
LLP, Spring 1995, at 13.
169. Dianne Solis, Mexico's Economic Crisis Pushes Unions to Consider Conces-
sions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at A4.
170. Dianne Solis, Americans Grow Ugly in Mexicans' Eyes, WALL ST. J., Mar.
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As the product of post-revolutionary Mexico, between 1910
and 1920, its labor laws are considered worker friendly.171 Al-
though the Mexican government wants to relax labor rules for
businesses,172 U.S. corporations must take care to comply with
these rules. Labor relations in Mexico and the United States
differ dramatically, and it is essential that U.S. companies un-
derstand the differences.
Under Mexican law, there is no "at will" employment. Mexi-
co protects the employee by providing for an indefinite term of
employment, with termination only for "cause."'7 3 Moreover, if
the employment is for a specific duration or task, the employee,
absent cause, is entitled to remain employed for the specified
duration or until the task is completed.'74 Even when termi-
21, 1995, at A6. Protesters Close Down Mexican Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1995, at A4.
171. Solis, supra note 169.
172. Id.
173. Rebecca A. Winterscheidt & Joseph E. Lambert, Termination of Employees
under Mexican Labor Law, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Jan. 31, 1995, at 16.
174. Id. Mexico's Federal Labor Law (LFT) lists fifteen acts or omissions that
constitute "cause" which allows an employer to rescind employment without liability:
1. Inducing the employer to hire the employee by false certification of skills
or abilities he or she does not possess;
2. Unprovoked on-the-job violence, dishonesty, threats, or mistreatment to the
employer or the employer's family or to management or administrative personnel;
3. Unprovoked on-the-job violence, dishonesty, threats, or mistreatment of co-
workers that disrupts workplace discipline;
4. Unprovoked off-duty violence, dishonesty, threats, or mistreatment to the
employer or the employer's family or to management or administrative personnel if
the misconduct is sufficiently serious to make fulfillment of the contract impossible;
5. Intentionally causing material damage to the employer's property during
performance of work;
6. Negligently causing serious damage to the employer's property if the negli-
gence is the sole cause of the damage;
7. Negligently endangering the safety of the establishment or persons therein;
8. Engaging in immoral behavior in the workplace;
9. Disclosing trade secrets or other confidential information to the detriment
of the company;
10. Being absent without permission or justification more than three days in
a thirty-day period;
11. Disobeying the employer as to a work-related matter without justification;
12. Refusing to follow safety procedures;
13. Reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or non-prescription
drugs;
14. Receiving a prison sentence which prevents the employee from performing
his or her duties;
15. Committing other acts similar in seriousness and consequences to those
above. Id.
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nating an employee for cause, the employer must abide by a
highly employee-favorable procedure:
1) the employer must provide the employee with a written
statement defining the date and reasons for the termination;
2) the discharged employee then has two months to appeal
to a Conciliation and Arbitration Board;
3) the employer, to justify the termination, must prove that
the employee engaged in one or more of the fifteen prohibited
categories of conduct; and
4) if the employer cannot meet its burden of proof, the em-
ployee is entitled to unadjusted back pay as well as either rein-
statement or "indemnification."17
An employee discharged without cause and prohibited from
reinstatement is entitled to indemnification equal to three
month's salary plus an additional amount.7 ' Any other em-
ployee terminated in violation of the law is given a choice of
reinstatement or indemnification equal to three months sala-
ry. 1
77
In a recent case, 118 Mexican factory workers, mostly wom-
en in their twenties, instituted suit in California nine months
after they were fired. The suit alleged that a U.S. company,
American United Global, Inc., fired the workers and then re-
fused to pay them severance benefits as required by Mexican
law.' 78 The employees actually worked for Exportadora de
Mano de Obra, registered as a Mexican company with a Mexican
general manager. Although American United Global maintained
that it and Exportadora de Mano de Obra were separate enti-
ties, it did settle for an undisclosed amount.
179
175. Id. A "confidential" employee (management, supervisors, inspectors) or one
who worked less than one year, provided domestic services, or worked on a transient
basis, is not entitled to choose reinstatement. Id.
176. Id. "Salary" includes premiums, bonuses, commissions, and fringe benefits.
If the employee's contract was for less than one year, the additional amount equals
full salary for half the entire period of employment. If the contract was for more
than one year, the additional amount equals six months' salary for the first year
plus twenty days' salary for each additional year of service. Id.
177. Id.
178. Fired Mexican Workers Settled with U.S. Firms, J. COM., Nov. 1, 1995, at
3A-
179. Id.
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Moreover, under the NAFTA side agreement on labor, Na-
tional Administrative Offices (NAOs) were set up to monitor
labor conditions in member countries. The offices had the au-
thority to implement trade sanctions in the event of misconduct
in the areas of child labor, minimum wages, health, and safe-
ty.is° However, in recent NAO cases involving General Electric,
Honeywell, and Sony Electronics, the U.S. NAO signaled that it
will not investigate the fairness of a member country's labor
practices.' Nevertheless, because the NAO monitors health
and safety conditions, U.S. companies need to comply with provi-
sions of Mexican law to avoid investigation and liability in coun-
tries with questionable labor practices."12
Exposure to labor liability is not, however, confined solely to
Mexico. In Argentina, where dismissal indemnity amounts equal
one month's wages per year worked, costly fringe benefits have
been onerous for business." These benefits constitute one of
the biggest disincentives to new hiring in Argentina."u Created
in the fall of 1995, a bill required an employer to make annual
contributions to a new pension plan fund. When fired, the termi-
nated employee receives unemployment benefits from the fund
over a set period of time.8 5
Like its South American neighbors, the Chilean government
is also in the process of modernizing labor laws. Proposals made
last fall would allow cross-firm wage negotiations in companies
with fewer than 100 employees, forbid employers from hiring
replacement workers during a strike, and establish a framework
for wage negotiations with temporary laborers in the agricultur-
180. Tim Shorrock, Labor Violations Not Addressed, U.S. Official Says, J. COM.,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 3A; Renee Haines, Mexican Border Plant Workers Allege Labor
Violations, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 13, 1995.
181. Winterscheidt & Lambert, supra note 173, at 18; Shorrock, supra note 180.
182. James Blears, 15 Minutes with Efrain Salazar Robles, Bus. MEX., Nov.
1995, at 6. Mr. Robles is General Manager for Mexico of Servicios Liberty, SA. de
C.V., a subsidiary of Boston-based Liberty International Risk Services. Mr. Robles
notes that in 1994 there were more than 500,000 on-the-job injuries in Mexico and
1,600 fatalities. He attributes the accidents, in large part, to a lack of safety. Id.
183. Debate Reopens on Labor Benefits, LAGNIAPPE LETrER, Nov. 10, 1995, at 2;
Paula L. Green, Argentina Untangles Knot of Labor Laws Gained over 40 Years, J.
CoM., July 10, 1995, at 5A.
184. Debate Reopens on Labor Benefits, supra note 183.
185. Id. In the fall of 1995, Argentina also enacted a new law requiring that
insurance companies pay damages resulting from accidents on the job and sets a
$55,000 cap on maximum indemnity. The new law applies to all government and
private sector employees. U.S./LATIN FINANCE, Nov. 1995, at 16.
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al sectors. However, critics claim that the proposal fails to ad-
dress an effective unemployment benefits program."
With labor reforms occurring throughout Latin America and
the current trend of U.S. companies to establish operations
there, U.S. business entities must pay careful attention to the
labor laws of the country in which they operate in order to avoid
costly penalties, adverse publicity, and potential liability pay-
ments.
An often predictable consequence of labor disputes in Latin
America, business interruptions are emerging as a liability and,
while not an entirely new concept in that region, are becoming a
greater source of potential liability as a U.S. corporate presence
continues to grow in Latin America. The factors affecting this
area of liability include labor strikes, bureaucratic delays and
corruption, theft and piracy, political upheavals, terrorism, and
natural catastrophes.
As the region experiences the rigors of privatization and
shrinking economies, unemployment, along with the hardship
and frustration resulting from it, will rise.'87 These actions will
likely lead to labor strikes, resulting in losses to U.S. companies
operating in the region. Events in the past year have already
begun to show this dissatisfaction among the labor force.
For example, in the spring of 1995, Brazilian dock workers
staged a long and costly strike in the nation's largest ports over
the issues of job security and wages." During the same period
Panama Canal pilots protested long operating hours and unsafe
labor conditions." 9 In August 1995, labor unrest and violence
erupted in Panama when the government passed a new labor
law that, while designed to make Panama more competitive in
the international labor market, reduced employment and pen-
sion plan benefits. 9 °
186. Labor Reforms Rankle Both Sides, LAGNIAPPE LETrER, Nov. 10, 1995, at 4.
187. Roberto Fabricio, Latin America's Income Gap, J. COM., Jan. 12, 1996, at
6A.
188. Brazilian Dockworkers Reach Last Days of Strikes, J. COM., Apr. 20, 1995,
at 8B; Michael Fabey & James Bruce, Dock Strikes in Brazil Snarling Shipments, J.
COM., Apr. 12, 1995, at 1A.
189. Tim Shorrock, Panama Canal Pilots Protest Long Hours, Unsafe Conditions,
J. COM., Apr. 20, 1995, at 8B.
190. Juan Pritsiolas, Unrest Looms in Panama with Labor Law's Passage, J.
COM., Aug. 16, 1995, at 2A-
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In the fall of 1995, fears of massive layoffs in Venezuela
associated with a privatization sale of four government owned
aluminum companies instigated concerned labor unions to orga-
nize opposition against the planned sale.19' In January 1996,
the Colombian Labor Minister held meetings to prevent a strike
by 10,000 banana workers at 280 plantations in the northwest
region of Uraba. The laborers were protesting against their
employer's refusal to raise wages by twenty-one percent.'92
In the spring of 1995, Mexican truckers threatened to
strike.'9 ' Later that year, the Brazilian government was
threatening to fire oil workers unless they ended their month-
long strike,'91 and 300 workers from the port of Kingston, Ja-
maica staged a strike to protest the level of wage increases.' 95
In February 1996, 200 peasants, who claimed an ownership
right in land owned by Chiquita Brands and disrupted opera-
tions for fifteen months, had to be removed from that land by
the Honduran military.9 ' In that same month, workers at
Petroleos del Peri (Petroperd) staged a strike to protest the
privatization of the industry, interrupting operations at oil refin-
eries and oil wells.
197
Problems associated with theft, robberies, piracy, govern-
ment corruption, and bureaucratic delays create costly business
interruptions on an ongoing basis. Guerrilla activities that
plague the region often target foreign operations as easy, visible,
and symbolic, and in the process create delays, disruption, and
losses for the business operations of the companies involved.'98
191. Union Fights CVG Sell-Off, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Nov. 10, 1995, at 8.
192. Colombian Minister Attempts to Avoid Strike by Banana Workers, Producers,
J. COM., Jan. 23, 1996, at 3A.
193. Kevin G. Hall, Mexican Truckers Threaten Strike, Seek Government Help, J.
CoM., Apr. 13, 1995, at 3B.
194. Brazil Threatens Petrobras Strikers with Mass Firing, Leaders with Jail, J.
CoM., June 1, 1995, at 5B.
195. Canute James, Port of Kingston Reopens as 300 Workers End Strike, J.
COM., Dec. 19, 1995, at 6B.
196. Echan a Campesinos Hondurefos De Una Finca de Chiquita Brands [Hon-
duran Peasants Are Thrown off Chiquita Brand's Farm Land], EL NUEVO HERALD,
Feb. 2, 1996, at lB.
197. Huelga Indefinida Contra Privatizaci6n de Petroperd [Indefinite Strike
Against the Privitization of Petroperdi], EL NUEVO HERALD, Feb. 2, 1996, at lB.
198. Julia Preton, On Eve of Talks, Mexican Rebels Seize Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1995, at A3; Patti Lane, Guerrillas Force Dole to Suspend Colombia Opera-
tion, J. COM., Sept. 19, 1995, at 1B; Calvin Sims, A Stepped-Up Terror Campaign in
Peru Shows the Shining Path Is Not Dead Yet, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1995, at A5;
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Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and
flooding often cause business interruptions in the region.' 99 In
September 1985, a large earthquake severely damaged Mexico
City. A decade later another earthquake occurred in Mexico,
albeit smaller than the previous one."° Yet another strong
earthquake hit Mexico's Pacific Coast on October 1995 near the
city of Manzanillo."' The quake destroyed two beach-side ho-
tels and heavily damaged several others,"2 killing fifty-seven
people and injuring more than 100.2" Earthquakes are a
continual threat throughout the region primarily because of the
Andes mountains, which run the entire length of western South
America. The entire area is seismically active.2'
According to figures released by Munich Re in 1995, the in-
creased concentration of economic value in catastrophe prone
regions of the world caused a fourteen-fold increase in the cost of
natural disasters between 1960 and 1995.2" This dramatic rise
will likely cause a "risk partnership" between policyholders and
insurers.2" In 1994, natural catastrophes and other casualties
resulted in insured losses of $18.8 billion, the third-largest fig-
ure ever recorded.0 7
Matt Moffett, Peruvian Firms Profit fom Normality, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1995, at
A16; James Brooke, Colombia Oil Spills Net Fines for All but Rebels, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1995, at A2; Leon Cyens, Guatemalean Marxists Vow to Fight to the Last
Indian, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A9; Calvin Sims, Persistent Rebel Threat Seen
in Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at A9; Asalto A Bus Deja 11 Muertos En Zona
Bananera Colombiana[Bus Attack Leaves 11 Dead in Colombian Bananero Zone], EL
NUEVO HERALD, Feb. 15, 1996, at 3B.
199. Gavin Souter, Demographic Changes in Latin America Require Risk Man-
agement Shifts, Bus. INS., Jan. 1, 1996, at 17.
200. Sam Dillon, Strong Earthquake Hits Mexico Coast, 57 Reported Killed, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al, A6.
201. Kevin G. Hall, 3 Weeks after Quake, Manzanillo Facility Set to Reopen, J.
COM., Nov. 3, 1996, at 6B.
202. Dillon, supra note 200.
203. Id.
204. An Earthquake in Chile Leads to an Advance in Copper Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1996, at C5; Advierten Que Volcdn Colombiano Podria Generar Alud [Warn-
ing that Colombian Volcano Could Generate Avalanche], EL NUEVO HERALD, Feb. 24,
1996, at 3B; Maremoto Deja Tres Muertos [Tidal Wave Leaves Three Dead], EL
NUEVO HERALD, Feb. 22, 1996, at 3B.
205. Ralph Atkins, Insurers Find Sharp Rise in Cost of Disasters, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1995, at 4; John F. Powell, Insurance Liability Woes Are Exported World-
wide, NAT'L L. J., May 5, 1995, at 8A.
206. Powell, supra note 205. See also John F. Donahue, Insurers Need Help with
Catastrophe Losses, BEST'S REV., Jan. 1996, at 58.
207. '94 Catastrophe Losses Soared to $18.8 Billion, J. COM., Apr. 10, 1995, at
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Therefore, as more U.S. financing, facilities, plants, and
machinery are invested into the region, it becomes increasingly
more important for risk managers of U.S. companies to take the
necessary steps, including adequate insurance coverage, to com-
pensate for losses associated with business interruptions, what-
ever their source.
E. Political Risk, Kidnapping, and Ransom
The several factors which will increase liability exposure to
U.S. and other multinationals doing business in Latin America
will at the same time directly affect the likelihood of an in-
creased "political risk" of losses these companies may experience
in the region.
For example, in November 1995, there were widespread
rumors of an impending coup in Mexico."°8 These rumors were
serious enough to further devaluate the peso,' 9 which could
indicate that locals with inside knowledge of the Mexican gov-
ernment believed such a takeover possible. El Barzon, named
after a revolutionary song about debt peonage and oppressive
land barons, is a significant protest movement developing in
Mexico which some diplomats feel has a greater potential for
disruption and social unrest than the famed Zapatista National
Liberation Army.2" °
In Colombia there are also potential rifts which could in-
crease political risk. The U.S. and Colombian governments are
currently arguing in the "banana battle," concerning restrictions
on banana imports to the European Union."' Political unrest
also exists over allegations that drug traffickers may have sup-
ported Colombia's President, Ernesto Samper, in his election
campaign.212 The U.S.'s recent decertification of Colombia may
7A. Prior to 1989, insured losses from catastrophes worldwide never accounted for
more than 0.02% of the industrialized countries' gross domestic product (GDP). Since
1989 they have never accounted for less than 0.04% of GDP. Rudolf Enz, Paying for
Disaster, GLOBAL REINSURANCE, Dec. 1995 - Feb. 1996, at 53.
208. Michael Scott, Rumors of Military Coup Depresses Mexican Peso, J. COM.,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 10A.
209. Id.
210. Henry Tricks, Protest Movement Provides Voice for Mexico's Middle-Class
Debtors, J. COM., Sept. 26, 1995, at 6A.
211. John Maggs, Dole May Use Budget Bill to Strip Colombia of Trade Benefits,
J. COM., Oct. 5, 1995, at IA.
212. U.S. Criticism of Panel Draws Colombia Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995,
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create further political dissension between the two countries.213
Either or both of these controversies could incite political insta-
bility in Colombia with concomitant political risks to U.S. com-
panies doing business there.
Kidnapping also poses a serious threat to U.S. companies in
Latin America. According to the U.S. Department of Justice,
there were an average of 620 kidnappings in the United States
annually over a six-year period ending in January 1994, with
the numbers overseas estimated to be even higher.214 Profes-
sional Indemnity Agency, Inc., which offers kidnap and ransom
coverage, reported that in recent years the monthly claims han-
dled under their program increased from an average of one
claim per month to four claims, split equally between the United
States and overseas.2
In light of this growing and serious threat, risk managers
and security managers of U.S. corporations operating in Latin
America must take the necessary steps to guard against political
risks and the threat of kidnappings associated with doing busi-
ness in that region. Moreover, because it is impossible to guar-
antee that these risks will not materialize, proper steps must
also be taken to insure against them and adopt appropriate
measures to compensate and mitigate economic and human
losses when they do occur.
F. Directors and Officers' Liability
Directors and officers' liability is not a well-developed area
of liability in Latin America. However, currency devaluation and
the significant losses a company may incur if its officers or direc-
tors fail to take appropriate steps in anticipation of such an
event may provide a source for such suits.216 In light of recent
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realignments of international monetary parity, risk managers,
directors, and officers of multinational companies face a chal-
lenge which will require their best insurance, financial, analyt-
ical, and political skills. 17
Corporate management of multinational companies should
also stay abreast of the following warnings, that in the past
have preceded most devaluations: 1) increased foreign indebt-
edness in the subject country; 2) a deficit trade balance; 3) high
inflation and increasing rates of inflation; 4) changes in quota-
tions on the foreign exchange markets; and 5) capital flight from
the subject country.2 8 If one or more of these warning signals
are identified, the probability of devaluation increases.
Companies operating in Latin America may protect their
assets against devaluation in several ways, including inserting a
devaluation clause in the master property damage/business
interruption policy, providing non-admitted protection for chang-
es in values, and applying co-insurance deficiency penalties.
219
Where possible, a corporation should also consider local policies
on a dollar denominated basis, particularly where imported
goods are involved. Additionally, business entities should fre-
quently review local inflation endorsements, designed to adjust
values automatically, for adequacy.2
Furthermore, companies must review policy limits for im-
ports and exports. Imports should be accounted for in monthly
reports at a new exchange rate. A parent corporation can protect
its shipments to foreign subsidiaries more effectively if it pur-
chases such shipments on a cost, insurance, and freight (CIF)
basis.2 2'
Although at the time of this writing there were no reported
cases involving a directors and officers' liability suit resulting
from losses secondary to devaluation, the Mexican devaluation of
December 20, 1994 and its consequential losses 222 to multina-
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tionals have now provided clear notice of this risk. The failure of
directors and officers to secure proper measures to compensate
for future devaluation could amount to a "wrongful act" on their
part, which, in turn, may result in a suit against them.
Another situation leading to directors and officers' liability
is lack of due diligence and appropriate investigative and securi-
ty measures to prevent an unwitting and innocent involvement
in money laundering operations on behalf of the company. The
business interruption, damage to reputation, and losses that are
likely to result from the seizures and forfeiture proceedings
associated with a money laundering sting and subsequent prose-
cution could cost a company millions of dollars. A scenario such
as this one, resulting from a lack of due care by those controlling
the company, could lead to a directors and officers' suit.
A final area of potential directors and officers' liability expo-
sure is that of employment related suits against U.S. and multi-
national employers operating in Latin America. A suit brought
against a company alleging illegal or improper labor practices or
termination would likely name the company's directors or offi-
cers directly involved in the alleged acts as defendants. Suits
naming these defendants have already occurred in the United
States and are likely to follow in Latin America.22
IV. INSURANCE OPENINGS AND PRODUCT AVAILABILITY
In the past five years, an unprecedented opening of the
insurance industry in Latin America has occurred." 4 Although
this opening is required by the NAFTA agreement, it is not
confined to the NAFTA countries.2" Effective as of January 1,
1996, the NAFTA now permits foreign insurers involved in joint
ventures with Mexican insurance companies before July 1992 to
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purchase up to 100% of the stock of these Mexican insurers.228
Foreign firms that have already invested in joint ventures with
Mexican insurers since July 1992 can increase their ownership
to forty percent as of January 1, 1996, up to forty-five percent in
1997, up to fifty-one percent in 1998, and up to seventy-five
percent in 1999.227 The NAFTA will allow foreign insurers com-
plete access to these Mexican companies in the year 2000.2"
As of October 20, 1995, twelve of the forty-eight insurance com-
panies constituting the Mexican market have foreign investors,
while another seven are subsidiaries of foreign insurers.229
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The Mexican financial and economic crisis proved difficult to
both domestic Mexican companies as well as multinational com-
panies operating there. However, a recent report by the Inter-
American Development Bank predicts that in 1996 Latin Ameri-
ca in general, and Mexico in particular, will "regain the path of
moderate growth with stability."230 Moreover, while five years
ago the Mexican insurance market was not even generating $3
billion in premiums, it had doubled in size by May 1995 and is
expected to be a $50 billion market by the year 2005.231 By the
year 2000, the number of insurance companies operating in
Mexico should reach one hundred.232 Hence, the number of for-
eign insurers operating in Mexico and the number and variety of
insurance products available are also likely to increase in the
near future.2 3
Mexico is not alone in the recent opening of access to its
insurance market. Insurance markets throughout most of Latin
America have also experienced expansion in the past five years,
allowing foreign insurers and reinsurers to penetrate an area
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that was previously controlled by governmental insurance and
reinsurance monopolies. Most Latin American governments have
eventually recognized that high protectionism and import substi-
tution are not the most effective means of promoting economic
development in the region.
In light of openings in insurance markets, the wave of
privatizations sweeping through the region, and the surge of
foreign investments in past years, Latin America's emerging
markets will fuel much of the future growth of the world's insur-
ance industry."M Henry Parker III, international insurance ad-
viser to Chubb & Son, stated "we will see a massive increase in
the insurance placed and the volume of insurance premiums
generated [in emerging markets], specially as newly privatized
industries seek the sophisticated coverage common to more na-
ture markets... ," and "by the year 2025 more than fifty per-
cent of total free world premium income will be generated by the
emerging markets .... "'
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Argentina are complete-
ly free markets, while Uruguay, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatema-
la, Paraguay, Honduras, Venezuela, and Costa Rica have begun
the liberalization process. Brazil, on the other hand, still has a
reinsurance monopoly, the Instituto de Reaseguros do Brasil, but
should also change in the next year or two because of
MERCOSUR. Cuba and Nicaragua still have completely state-
controlled markets. 6
As of 1995, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina accounted for
approximately seventy-seven percent of the region's premium
income; Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela accounted for about
eighteen percent; the rest of Latin America was responsible for
the remaining five percent. 237 The average insurance expendi-
ture in Latin America is only $127 per year, representing low
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penetration and leaving a large opportunity for growth."8
While Chile, because of its 100% free market, has become
the Latin American base of operation for many U.S. insurers
and brokers,2" Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico dominate the
Latin American insurance market.2" Moreover, Latin Ameri-
can insurers are becoming more sophisticated, not only in policy
wording, policy forms, and underwriting practices, but also in
incorporating modern computer technology into their busi-
nesses."' These advancements are attributable, at least in
part, to the freedom to operate in the international reinsurance
market without the "protection" of governmental monopolies.
Finally, in addition to the foreign insurers entering the region,
Latin America has also become home to a large number of cap-
tive insurers, formed by Latin American companies to reduce
costs, improve corporate control over risk financing, develop a
more structured risk management program, and develop better
access to the reinsurance market.242 Expected to triple by the
year 2000, captives will reach a record number of forty.2"
V. CONCLUSION
The emerging areas of liability enumerated are not "new" in
the literal sense of that word. However, as a result of the signifi-
cant increase in trade between the Americas and expanded in-
vestment in Mexico and Latin America, these areas are acquir-
ing much more importance to U.S. companies operating there.
While business opportunities continue to emerge in the
region, U.S. multinationals doing business south of the border
must pay careful attention to the various liability issues dis-
cussed in this Article. Even more important is the need for U.S.
companies to take the appropriate steps to address and com-
pensate for them. There is an increased requirement for insur-
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ance coverage of various types in order to protect company as-
sets from these potential liabilities. Additionally, it is essential
that companies implement adequate risk management and loss
control services, as well as establish an "in place" network of
legal counsel both in Latin America and in the United States.
These precautions will ensure that the U.S. business will be
informed of pertinent legal issues and have the capability to
quickly address claims and matters related to such claims, ulti-
mately minimizing liability exposure to the company.
